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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellee/Respondent,
v.

Case No. 20050001-SC

RALPH LEVIN,
Appellant/Petitioner.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2^2(3)(a) and (5) (2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the court of appeals erred in affording the trial court deference in the
application of the underlying facts to the legal determination of whether Levin was in
custody for Fifth Amendment and Miranda purposes? On certiorari review, this Court
reviews the decision of the court of appeals non-deferentially for correctness. State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, fl 1, 103 P.3d 699 (citations omitted). "One of the components of
the court of appeals's decision that [this Court] examinees] for correctness is the standard
of review which it applied to the ruling of the trial court. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, fS9
13 P.3d 576. This issue is preserved in the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals. State v.
Levin, 2004 UT App 396, 103 P.3d 846.
1

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
In State v, Levin, 2004 UT App 396, 101 P.3d 846, the Utah Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court's denial of Levin's motion to suppress by utilizing a deferential
standard of review. This Court subsequently granted Levin's petition for a writ of
certiorari.

B,

Lower Court Proceedings and Disposition
Ralph Levin was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on June 21,

2001, with: possession or use of marijuana with a prior conviction, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a5(1); and having an open container in a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in \iolation of
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.20(2) (R. 2). The State filed an amended information on
December 24, 2001, amending the open container in a vehicle charge to a class B
misdemeanor pursuant to Utah County Code § 23-2-10 (R. 43).
On December 20, 2001, Levin filed a Motion to Suppress, asserting that any
statements elicited pursuant to interrogation should be suppressed because he was subject
2

to custodial interrogation without being advised of his rights per Miranda, including his
right to remain silent in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (R. 29-30). On May 22, 2002, the trial court denied Levin's motion to
suppress (R. 72,110). The trial court determined that Levin was not "in custody" and not
subject to interrogation for Fifth Amendment and Miranda purposes (R. 110-18).
A jury trial was held on May 22, 2002 and Levin was found guilty of possession of
marijuana with a prior conviction and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 150, 151,
294).

At the beginning of trial, Levin renewed his motion to suppress any incriminating

statements made on the grounds that they were obtained in violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights and Miranda (R. 293: 7)
On August 12, 2002, Levin was placed on probation for 24 months and ordered to
serve 80 days in the work diversion program at the Utah County Jail (R. 182).
On September 13, 2002, Levin filed a notice of appeal in the Fourth District Court
(R. 209). On January 23, 2003, Levin filed a Petition for post-conviction relief because
his trial counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal in this matter (R. 255-58). The
trial court granted the motion for post-conviction relief and Levin was re-sentenced on
March 24, 2003 (R. 267, 282). Levin filed a timely notice of appeal on April 9, 2003 (R.
290).
On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Levin's
motion to suppress. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in finding that
Levin was not subjected to "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda, but agreed that
3

Levin was not in "custody" at the time the interrogation took place. State v Levin, 2004
UT App 396, <H's 11-12, 101 P.3d 846. In reaching this holding, the court of appeals
employed a standard of review which afforded the trial court "a degree of discretion" in
the application of the underlying facts to the appropriate legal standard. Id. at f 7 and f20.
Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that "the question of whether a police
statement is so accusatory as to coerce a suspect into an unwanted confession is a
question of degree for which the trial court is best suited to decide. Therefore, in
determining whether Deputy Keith's statement was so accusatory that it would 'affect
how a reasonable person ... would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action,' we
afford the trial court considerable discretion." Id. at 121 (quoting Stansbury v. California,
511 U.S. 318,325, 114S.CL 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)). A copy of the court of
appeals' decision is included in the Addenda.
On April 5, 2005, this Court granted certiorari review on the following issue:
"Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in reviewing the
district court's determination that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of
Miranda protections." A copy of this Court's order is included in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Levin asserts that several significant facts were left out of the court of appeals'
opinion. Accordingly, Levin also includes a complete statement of the facts from both
the suppression hearing and the jury trial.
4

A

Statement of facts set forth in the court of appeals' opinion at 2004 UT App

In May 2001, Dei v

s
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when he noticed that the registration tags of a convertible car parked on the suie of • r
road were expired (R. 292: 17-19NI ii'ii ii'ii n<Mjly ill i|l
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.lied uy- K'hind the car and walked to die cor on

. -,.. ; . ., . .
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tU

> convertible roof was dc-yn

and, while standing beside''
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view and asked the occupants for i d e n L ^ ^ o n (R. 292: 20). I Jpon a subsequent se«u ch
oi ilk. vehicle, he found a "socket" tool that had been used to smoke marijuana and
several small IMJJ.S umtdiniiig iiiaujiKiiia HI a backpack.(R. 292: 21).
Deputy Keith radioed u.wdv *> ?• *. *»- *»
23). When the officers arrived they conducted several field ^obiiety i^u> that indicated
thu; .i»c dmei, i.evin, had been smoking marijuana (R. 292: 31; R. 294: 73-74, 78-79).
Hnwrvu , Depimh knll ilolu mined thai 1 cvin was not under the influence of alcohol or
drugs (R. 294: 36). Deputy Keith testitV.
36).
Deputy Keith "pulled j Levin] aside" and questioned him out of the presence of the
otln f H f". passengers «R. *!'M 'M

A lun Deputy Keith asked Lovm if he had been

aiiiuking marijuana, Levin responded tlmt he 1iu«< I m m 11.'

H

>" ' i 11

11 1 V|

"f atted down" Levin but found no marijuana on his person (R. 294: 56). Keith also
detected no scent of marijuana or alcohol on Levin (R. 294: 56, 70). At some point,
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Deputy Keith stated that he knew Levin had been smoking marijuana, to which Levin
responded he had (R. 292: 26). In fact, Deputy Keith repeatedly questioned Levin and
then told him, "there was no doubt in my mind that you' vc been smoking marijuana" (R.
294: 37, 59). Levin was detained at the side of the road for one to one-and-a-half hours
(R. 294: 58-59, 61).

B. Statement of facts from testimony at the suppression hearing.
Deputy Wayne Keith of the Utah County Sheriffs Office was on patrol on May 2,
2001, on the dike road that goes around the Provo airport (R. 292: 17-18). Keith
observed a convertible vehicle parked in a turn-out with an expired registration (R. 292:
18, 19, 29). Keith stopped behind the vehicle "to talk with the driver to see if he was
aware that his registration was expired" (Id.). Keith approached the three occupants and
identified the driver as Ralph Levin (R. 292: 19, 20). Keith did not activate his overhead
lights or block the vehicle with his car (R. 292: 18-19).
As Keith was speaking with Levin, he noticed some open containers of alcohol in
the vehicle (R. 292: 20). Keith had the occupants exit the vehicle look for additional
open containers (R. 292: 20). At this point none of the occupants were placed in handcuffs and Keith's weapon was not drawn (R. 292: 21). However, Keith also testified that
none of the occupants was free to leave the scene (R. 292: 30).
Keith searched the vehicle and found a socket with burnt and residual marijuana in
a compartment between the driver and passenger seat (R. 292: 21). Keith continued his
6

search and found marijuana and other related items in a backpack that belonged to one of
lIn" olliei individuals, Richard Johnson (R. 292: 22-23).
Annlhi mi i IMI|III ml deputies uiusrd lu a^ul kulli I

{

LL 1 U Keith u>ndikled

field sobriety tests on Levin and the other deputies did some dr ^ r .>omtiru * o*
him (R. 292: 23, ?' 1 \ Keith testified that Levin passed the field sobriety tests and that he
, Liouig t-; ue arrested lor UU1 U\ -92: 24) Levin was still not free to leave (R.

Keith asked Levin about his knowledge of the socket in, the vehicle an)1 wheih i h •
had, used it to smoke marijuana (R. 29,2: 25, 35). Levin denied any knowledge or use of it
(R,„. 292: 25, 35) I he other deputies, however, informed Keith, that they believed that
Levin was und-T-thiMnHiw-

. ."s. ... .

11,< (>^j («"i, \ \ >

.

-n cross-

examination that it is possible for some prescribed medications to cause impairm*
is similar to that caused by marijuana (R , 292: 33),
Keith again asked Li \ ih about the socket and Levin/again denied, any knowledge
of it (R. 292: 2d), Keith llicii ml In I i " iiiiii ' riii'ir' mi ill in ill nil iiiiii m> iiiiiiiiiiiill ih.il you' ve
been Miioking marijuana" (R. 292: 26 j . Keith testified thai tlii& was phrased a^> a
statement to Levin and not a questii -n T\ 292: 26' K Ith testified that he did not expect
I
respouu^u mat "he h.v

- .

* .

fowever according t^ Keith, I evin

l

her

occupant] had smoked out of a pipe that I had not located at that point
27). On cross-examination,, however, Keith at one point, testified that suspects often make
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replies to comments (R. 292: 37, 39).
The trial court denied Levin's motion to suppress and concluded that Levin was
not in custody for purposes of Miranda (R. 110-18).

C.

Statement of facts from testimony during the jury trial.
1.

Testimony of Sheriff Wayne Keith

Wayne Keith is a police officer with the Utah County Sheriffs Office (R. 294: 16).
On May 1, 2001, Keith was patrolling an area just north of the Provo Boat Harbor near
Utah Lake and where he observed a parked vehicle with an expired registration sticker
(R. 294: 17). Three people were in the convertible and Keith parked behind them and
spoke with Levin, the driver (R. 294: 17-18).
Keith saw "several open containers" as he was speaking with the three men and
asked them to stop out of the vehicle "so I could do a more thorough search" for
additional evidence (R. 294: 19-20).
Keith found several containers behind the driver's seat and also looked in the
vehicle's center console in between the driver and passenger seat (R. 294: 19-20). As
Keith opened the console, he smelled burnt marijuana and observed that a ratchet or
socket tool had been used to smoke marijuana and it still contained burnt and unburnt
marijuana (R. 294: 22).
Keith continued to search the car for evidence and picked up a backpack belonging
to the passenger sitting in the back seat, Richard Johnson (R. 294: 26). As Keith picked
8

up the backpack, Johnson immediately said that the backpack was his but that there was
nothing illegal in the backpack (R. 294: 26). Keith searched the backpack and found
three baggies containing marijuana and some pills (R. 294: 21).
Keith i ili'lif il hi! h ii l.ii|i .imi iln il i imdurieil nelil *nl>iiei) li'Mh on Lv\ in IO
determine whether he was under the influence which would affect hia dn Mr.

:

33), The other officers actually arrived prior \o the lime Keith conducted the field
Atter Levin underwent the field sobriety tests, K; "4l

sobriety tests on Lev in (R. 294::
detenu ined that he \ \ as not m mde

*

•

other officers also conducted field sobriety tests on Levin (R. 294: 57).
Keith then "pulled [Levin] aside" and questioned him out of the presence oi „__
••:,

^scjigci N , • ,

.

a asked Levin about the socket and marijuana and

Levin repeatedly insisted
had not smoked marijuana out oi the socket (R. 294: 3'/,. i^idi "patted down " Levm out
found no m...arijuana on his'person (R. 294: 56). Keith also detected no scent of marijuana
or alcohol on I = • i in (R 29' I : 56, 1 0)

Keith could not rememK i ii Levin told him that he

was takini: medication lor a shoulder ni|iii r, hill Hi HI;''III I ill vwiis "possihle11 (K '"'M l\ 'I
Keith continued to question Levin and then told him "there wras no doubt in my .
mind that you've been smoking marijuana" (R. 294: 37, 59V A! no point did Keith read
1

. ^ciUiuiathehao .atvcu fca roupleof h^N"

•• h

with Johnson, > •* '•

-

.,

.

.

;

...possessed any marijuana (R. 294: 37-38). Levin told Keith that he did not sm< :>t; e < );i it • : f
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the socket, but that he had smoked marijuana out of a pipe that Keith had not yet found
(R. 294: 40).
Keith questioned Winger about smoking marijuana, but admitted that the
questioning was not extensive (R. 294: 41). Keith also read Johnson his rights pursuant
to Miranda and questioned him regarding the marijuana, however neither Winger or
Johnson were required to undergo any field sobriety tests (R. 294: 41, 235). Johnson
admitted to smoking marijuana with Levin but was also adamant that Winger did not
smoke any (R. 294: 41). Johnson originally stated that they had smoked from the ratchet,
but then stated that they smoked from a pipe which he threw into the lake (EL 294: 41-42).
But later, Johnson told Keith that he thought he had smoked it alone and that Levin did
not smoke at all (R. 294: 42, 237-38).
Keith testified that he believed he had Levin and the other two stopped for about
an hour before they were free to go (R. 294: 58-59, 61). When Levin began to drive
away, another officer noticed a pipe underneath the convertible and Keith asked Johnson
if that was the pipe he used to smoke the marijuana in and Johnson said yes (R. 294: 6465).
On rebuttal, Keith testified that he performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on
Levin before the other officer arrived (R. 249: 221). Keith stated that Levin had no
involuntary twitching of the eye (R. 249: 222). However, Keith testified that this was
consistent with marijuana use (R. 249: 222). Keith later admitted that this test is
performed to see whether a person is impaired from drinking alcohol, and because Levin
10

only drank a few wine coolers it was possible that he would not have the involuntary
iwii'Jimgtk. 2 49:243-34).
2.

1 est in imp nl < Hln i i '1 Il i I < hlon

Todd Ortoii is a police officer wm

*

..

. ..

certified drug recognition expert or DRE (R. 294: 71, 74). A URE is an officer that has
^mi. lii.uu^ii uaiiiiiig u/ learn the different categories of drugs and their effects on the

Orton testified that marijuana use causes a person" \ \ nils* it»\(trn 1 up .tinI IIM >
causes a lack of convergence, or inability to cross one's eyes and remained focused (R.
1v •

•

ion also testified that hydroctodone or similar' pain relieving drags have

tin; opposite cilivl tht/y ilmvasp a pci^on's pulse uhd constrict aperson's pupils,, causing
a convergence of the eyes (R. 294: 77).
. Orton responded to Keith's call for assistance on May 1, 2001 (R. 294: 71). When
Oi l«i i i ai ii vcd nl the scene, Keith asked tiim,. to perform some tests on. Levin (R 294: 72),
Ortoii look I e\ i>» pnl ,'• ,\"*\ 'l"\slifrd (In! H was l.islci llian normal, about 120 beats per
minute (R. 294: 72-73, 90). Orton also tested Levin for a lack, of ^onwrp/nec t A I he ryes
/p oo/j- ^^
\cIIUIU

•
nit

T ^ ~ tests a person's ability 10 touch their finger to their nose to see if their
'

i • .i, .
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^t^rj stated that Levin " i ; l d .not cross his eyes or

'"

^u\

wa<? consistent with

.,—Lid use; however some people cannot cross Ihni , \ <M, i( i1 • F '' i '

v

.
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also testified that, is was impossible for a person on pain medication to have a hitih p» .
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rate and not be able to converge his eyes (R. 294: 80). Orton testified that a lack of
convergence only results from a person using marijuana, PCP, or inhalants, unless that
individual cannot cross her eyes anyway (R. 294: 80, 86-89, 106). Orton admitted that
other things might cause a higher than normal pulse rate, but only running or drugs would
cause a pulse rate of 120 (R. 294: 90).
Orton was not sure if Levin told him that he had taken medication that day on an
empty stomach (R. 294: 107-08). Orton also admitted that he was unsure what effect
several different medications would simultaneously have on the body, but he told Keith
that he thought Levin was under the influence of marijuana (R. 294: 92-93, 95).
Orton testified that he did not conduct a full DRE exam on Levin (R. 294: 82). A
full exam would take about an hour and a half and Orton only spent "maybe, five minutes"
with Levin (R. 294: 82-83). A full exam also consists of blood and urine samples to
identify what drugs are in the body, which Orton did not do (R. 294: 94, 97-98).
On redirect examination, Orton testified that some muscle relaxants are
depressants and that some depressants also cause a lack of convergence (R. 294: 103-04).
3.

Testimony of Officer Charles Beeder

Charles Beeder is a police officer with the Utah County Sheriffs Department (R.
294: 110). Beeder testified that he is also a drug recognition expert, or DRE (R. 294:
112).
Beeder was with Orton on May 1, 2001, and they both responded to Keith's call
for backup assistance (R. 294: 111). Keith told Beeder that he had "three individuals in
12

the vehicle out of the vehicle, and he had done a search of the vehicle and come up with
some evidence, and he wanted us to check the driver [Levin] to see if there might be a
possibility that he might be under the influence of drugs" (R. 294: 111).
Beeder assisted Orton conduct the eye convergence test on Levin by watching
Orton (R. 294: 112,120). Beeder also did not test Levin's pulse, and after a leading
question by the prosecutor agreed that it could have been around 120, but he did not
remember (R. 294: 114). Beeder testified that a person that has consumed alcohol and is
also under the influence of Lortab or hydrocodone would have a low pulse rate and
constricted pupils, or no lack of convergence (R. 294: 118). But Beeder also testified that
a high level of alcohol consumption could cause a lack of convergence (R. 294: 122).
Beeder thought Levin was under the influence of marijuana, but he could not be sure (R.
294: 119).
Beeder testified that a full DRE exam includes blood and urine samples to pinpoint
what drugs are in a persons system (R. 294: 124). Levin was not subjected to a blood or
urine test (R. 294: 124). Beeder also did not know what effects a cortisone injection
would have on a person (R. 294: 129).
4.

Testimony of Richard Johnson

Richard Johnson and Ralph Levin are friends (R. 294: 133). On May 1, 2001,
Levin, Johnson, and Winger went to Utah Lake together (R. 294: 133). When Levin
picked Johnson up, Johnson had his backpack with him which contained marijuana (R.
294: 133). Levin did not know that Johnson had marijuana with him (R. 294: 134).
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When they arrived at the lake, Levin and Winger went for a walk (R. 294: 134).
Winger is handicapped so Levin assisted him (R. 294: 134). Johnson stayed at the vehicle
and sat in the front and listened to some CD's and also began to smoke some marijuana
while Levin and Winger were away (R. 294: 134, 134). Johnson used the ratchet tool to
smoke the marijuana, which he brought with him (R. 294: 135-36). As Levin and Winger
were returning to the car, he hurried and placed the ratchet in the console and went to the
back of the car because he did not want them to see him (R. 294: 136, 138).
Johnson also admitted that he also brought the pipe the police found on the ground
under the car (R. 294: 136). Johnson explained that the pipe was his and when the police
came, he shoved the pipe inside his pants and that is must have fallen out when he was
outside being questioned (R. 294: 136-37).
When Officer Keith arrived, he asked them to step out of the car and then he
searched Johnson's backpack (R. 294: 139). Johnson admitted that the marijuana was his
(R. 294: 141). Keith told Johnson that Levin told him that they had smoked marijuana
together, but Johnson denied this (R. 294: 141). Johnson told Keith that Levin did not
smoke any (R. 294: 141).
5.

Testimony of Ralph Levin

On May 1, 2001, Ralph Levin picked up his ex-brother-in-law, Michael Winger, to
"get him out of his apartment and let him get a breath of fresh air" (R. 249: 166). Winger
recently sustained an injury causing partial paralysis and Levin routinely checked on him
to make sure he was doing all right (R. 249: 166).
14

They both decided to go down to Utah Lake near the airport and watch the planes
take off and land (R. 249: 167). On the way, they stopped at a gas station and purchased
a six-pack of beer and a four-pack of wine coolers (R. 249: 167). As Levin walked out of
the gas station, he saw Johnson in the parking lot (R. 249: 167-68). They all decided to
go to the lake together and Johnson got in the back seat (R. 249: 175).
In February 2001, Levin re-injured his shoulder in an automobile accident (R. 249:
169-70). He originally tore his rotator cuff which required surgery in 1999 (R. 249: 169).
As a result of this recent re-injury, Levin was prescribed Lortab, a pain medication,
methocarbamol, an anti-inflammatory, and a muscle relaxant (R. 249: 170-71). His
doctor was also giving him cortisone injections (R. 249: 170). On the morning of this
incident, Levin took both Lortab and methocarbamol on an empty stomach (R. 249: 174).
When they arrived at the lake, they just sat around for five or ten minutes (R. 249:
175). Winger wanted to stretch his legs, so Levin helped him walk down the road (R.
249: 175). Winger's paralysis allowed him to walk with some help, but he takes
medication to help with his balance (R. 249: 166-67). As they walked, Levin drank two
of the wine coolers and Winger drank one (R. 249: 176).
After about twenty or thirty minutes of walking, Levin and Winger came back to
the car (R. 249: 177). Levin could see that Johnson was smoking out of a pipe and
noticed him trying to put it away as they got closer (R. 249: 177).
About twenty minutes later, Officer Keith pulled up (R. 249: 178). Keith informed
Levin that his registration was expired and asked to see his driver's license (R. 249: 178).
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Keith then noticed a few open containers in the car and began to search the car (R. 249:
178-79). During the search, Keith found a socket in the center console (R. 249: 179).
Levin told Keith that the socket was not his and that he did not knowr anything
about it (R. 249: 180). Keith then asked him if he had been smoking marijuana, and
Levin said, "it's not mine, and I don't smoke marijuana, and I haven't smoked marijuana"
(R. 249: 181). During the next hour to hour-and-a-half, Keith continued to ask Levin if
he had been smoking marijuana and Levin "told him pretty adamantly" that he had not (R.
249: 181).
Keith eventually performed field sobriety tests on Levin, which he passed (R. 249:
181-82). Then two other officers came and also performed a few tests on him (R. 249:
182). Officer Orton told Levin, "Look, I know you're on something. I know you've been
smoking marijuana, and I know you're on drugs." (R. 249: 183). Keith also accused
Levin and told him that he knew he had been smoking marijuana (R. 249: 183). Levin
again denied these accusations and told him that he had an injury and was on pain
medications (R. 249: 183). At no point did the officers read Levin his rights per Miranda
(R. 249: 182-84).
Keith then told Levin that he could impound his car and take him to jail (R. 249:
14). Levin knew that Winger needed to get back home in order to take his medication
and he did not want his vehicle impounded (R. 249: 184). In order to get back home and
end the prolonged questioning, Levin finally said, "Fine. I took a couple of hits" (R. 249:
184).
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Keith then gave Levin a citation for marijuana and having open containers in his
car (R. 249: 185). Levin initially refused to sign it, saying he was not guilty of the
marijuana charge (R. 249: 185). Levin admitted to having the open containers in his car
but he again adamantly denied possessing or using the marijuana (R. 249: 185). Keith
then told him to sign the ticket or go to jail (R. 249: 185). Levin then signed the ticket (R.
249: 185). Levin testified that they were detained by the officers for 60-90 minutes (R.
294: 181).
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Levin, "Have you ever been charged
with marijuana possession before?" (R. 249: 210). Then he asked, "And in fact, on
February 2, 2000, did you plead no contest to possessing less than a pound of marijuana?"
(R. 249: 210). Levin responded "yes" (R. 249: 211).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Levin asserts that the court of appeals correctly determined that he was subjected
to interrogation for Miranda purposes, but then erroneously concluded that he was not in
custody for Miranda purposes. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at H I 1, 23. In reaching this
decision, the court of appeals utilized a standard of review which afforded the trial court
deference. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals correctly cited the four factors
listed in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). However, because
of the deference afforded the trial court, the court of appeals failed to adequately consider
the four Carner factors in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances. This led the
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court of appeals to erroneously affirm the trial court's denial of Levin's motion to
suppress.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYED AN INCORRECT STANDARD
OF REVIEW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL THAT
LEVIN WAS NOT IN CUSTODY PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTIONS
AFFORDED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
Prior to trial, Levin filed a motion to suppress asserting that all statements which
had been elicited pursuant to custodial interrogation should be suppressed because he was
not advised of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination per Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), including his right to remain silent
(R. 29-30).l After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion concluding that Levin was
not "in custody", and was not subjected to interrogation, for Fifth Amendment and
Miranda purposes (R. 72, 110-18). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.
State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396, 101 P.3d 846.
Levin asserts that the court of appeals correctly determined that he was subjected
to interrogation for Miranda purposes, but then erroneously concluded that he was not in
custody for Miranda purposes. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at I f 11, 23. In reaching this
decision, the court of appeals utilized a standard of review which afforded the trial court

*Levin also renewed his suppression motion at the beginning of trial (R. 293: 7).
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deference.

A.

The court of appeals erred in its application of a deferential standard of
review.
Levin asserts that the court of appeals erred in its choice of standard of review

which granted the trial court deference in its application of fact to law. Levin, 2004 UT
App 396 at f][7, 20, 21. In Levin, the court of appeals held that "because the
determination of custody is fact-sensitive and '"the facts to which the legal rule is to be
applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all
these facts can be spelled out," we recognize that the trial court has a degree of discretion
'unless such determination exceeds established legal boundaries.'" State v. Levin, 2004
UT App 396, <H7, 20, 101 P.3d 846 (quoting State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah
App. 1994) quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). While the court of
appeals stated that it would give the trial court "a degree of discretion," Levin asserts that
in fact the appeals court afforded the trial court at least "considerable discretion" in its
application of the law to the underlying factual findings. Id. at f 21. The court of appeals
stated that "the question of whether a police statement is so accusatory as to coerce a
suspect into an unwanted confession is a question of degree for which the trial court is
best suited to decide. Therefore ... we afford the trial court considerable discretion" Id.
Levin asserts that this standard of review is in direct conflict with this Court's
decisions and that there is a split in decisions from the court of appeals on what the
correct standard of review should be in determining whether an individual is in custody
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for purposes of Miranda protections.
Levin asserts that this Court has typically applied a non-deferential standard for
reviewing lower courts' ultimate legal decisions in regards to suppression
motions-including motions to suppress pursuant to Miranda concerning Fifth
Amendment violations. See, State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998) (trial court's
factual findings reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions reviewed for correctness);
State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995) (factual findings reviewed for clear
error while legal conclusions reviewed non-deferentially for correctness); State v. Wood,
868 P.2d 70, 82 (Utah 1993) (trial court's determination of custody based on undisputed
facts reviewed for correctness).
Levin also asserts that the court of appeals has not consistently applied the same
standard of review to Miranda issues. In fact, two distinct standards can be found in
various decisions from the appeals court:
One, some court of appeals decisions have adopted the same standard generally
utilized by this Court in reviewing a trial court's decision in regards to suppression
motions which is that the trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error while
its ultimate legal conclusions are reviewed for non-deferentially for correctness. See,
State v. Mired, 2002 UT App 291,18, 55 P.3d 1158; State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81
(Utah App. 1998); and State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103-04 (Utah App. 1990), cert,
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert denied, 503 U.S. 914, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117
L.Ed.2d 507 (1992).
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On the other hand, other decisions from the court of appeals have employed a
deferential standard of review to Miranda issues. For example, in this case the court of
appeals' utilization of a standard affording deference to the trial court was based on the
same deferential standard set forth by the court of appeals in State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d
922 (Utah App. 1994). Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f7 ? Teuscher relied upon an
interpretation of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994), wherein this Court
discussed the standard of review generally applicable to mixed questions of law and fact.
Furthermore, Levin asserts that in this case the court of appeals went far beyond
affording "a degree of discretion" to the trial court as set forth in Teuscher and Pena. In
its decision the appeals court cites language from Strausberg and Teuscher that trial
courts are accorded "a measure of discretion" to the determination of custody for
Miranda purposes because the issue is "fact sensitive." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at ^20
(citations omitted). The court of appeals then states the conclusion from Strausberg that
"the defendant was not in custody because the 'question was not coercive and was merely
investigatory in nature.'" Id. (quoting Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 835). The court of appeals
goes on to make the following statement:
We agree that the question of whether a police statement is so accusatory as
to coerce a suspect into an unwanted confession is a question of degree for which

2

The court of appeals also cites to its prior decision in State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d
831 (Utah App. 1993). Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at 120. The appeals court in Strausberg
also relied on the same language from Pena cited by the appeals court in Teuscher.
Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 834 n.5.
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the trial court is best suited to decide. [FN1] Therefore, in determining whether
Deputy Keith's statement was so accusatory that it would "affect how a reasonable
person ... would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action," Stansbury, 511
U.S. at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (quotations and citations omitted), we afford the trial
court considerable discretion.
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
"although the statement made by Deputy Keith was accusatory, it was not overly
accusatory." Such a conclusion does not "exceed [ ] established legal boundaries,"
particularly because the Strausberg court reached a similar conclusion with similar
facts. 895 P.2d at 834-35. As such, we rely on the trial court's determination that
Deputy Keith's statement was not so accusatory as to coerce Levin into making an
incriminating statement.
Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f P l - 2 2 . In footnote 1 the appeals court quotes language
from this Court in Pena concerning the superior position of trial courts to assess witness
credibility and to weigh fact intensive considerations. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at n.l
(quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 936). Levin takes issue with the discretion afforded by the
court of appeals in this case for the following reasons:
One, because the court of appeals granted the trial court total discretion-rather
than a degree of discretion or even considerable discretion-in the determination of
whether the officer's statement, viewed from a reasonable person standard, was "so
accusatory as to coerce [Levin] into an unwanted confession." Levin, 2004 UT App 396
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atffl21^22.
Two, because the court of appeals takes this Court's language in Pena out of
context. The Pena language utilized by the appeals court is not from a discussion
concerning the application of law to fact as alluded to by the court of appeals, rather the
language quoted and cited is from this Court's discussion in Pena which concerns a trial
court's purely factual findings and its appUcable standard of "clear error." This Court's
complete language in Pena is as follows:
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making determinations of
fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly
erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the
factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record,
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination. See Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 1\\ P.2d 250, 252 (Utah
1985); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68
S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). This standard is highly deferential to the trial
court because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the
evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to be in the
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the
proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a
cold record. In re J. Children, 664 P.2d 1158,1161 (Utah 1983).
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36.
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Levin acknowledges that a trial court's factual findings are reviewed by appellate
courts for clear error. However, the determination of whether a reasonable person given a
set of facts would find a statement so accusatory as to affect "the breadth of... freedom of
action" is not purely a factual determination. It is a mixed question of fact and law which
requires that the underlying facts be applied to the appropriate legal standard.
Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in granting the trial court total discretion in
making this determination.
This Court recently addressed a similar question in regards to the appropriate
standard of review for appellate consideration of motions to suppress which arise out of a
search and seizure context. In State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, <fll2, 103 P.3d 699, this Court,
on certiorari review, adopted a non-deferential standard of review to highly fact sensitive
Fourth Amendment issues.
In Brake, the court of appeals applied a similar standard of review that the appeals
court utilized in Levin. The court of appeals' in Brake employed the following standard
of review: "[a] trial court's factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly
erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some
discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual
findings." Id. a t ! 12 (quoting State v. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, f 11, 51 P.3d 31). This
Court explicitly rejected the deferential standard for highly fact sensitive search and
seizure cases. Id. at f 15. In so doing, it reviewed the opinion in Pena, and noted that
Pena cited State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), wherein a non-deferential
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standard was applied to consent cases. Id. at f 14. This Court also noted that in other
highly fact sensitive cases, such as search incident to arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic
stop, and protective searches, a non-deferential standard is applied. Id. at f 15.
Levin asserts that the determination of whether a person is in custody for Miranda
purposes is analogous to the determination of whether a search and seizure is lawful for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Both issues present a mixed question of law and fact and
Levin asserts that "while there were varying fact patterns that would be relevant to
determinations of... [custody], they [are] not so unmanageable in their variety as to
outweigh the interest in having uniform legal rules regarding ... [custody], given the
substantial... [Fifth] Amendment interests lost as a result of such ... [admissions]."
Brake, 2004 UT 95 at f 14 (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 (citing Thurman, 846 P.2d at
1271)). Levin asserts that this is particularly true because the framework for determining
an individual's custodial status for Fifth Amendment protections has been consistently in
place for more than twenty-years with this Court's decision in Salt Lake City v. Carrier,
664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). See Wood, 868 P.2d at 82 n.2 ("[I]n Utah the appropriate
standard for determining whether an interrogation prior to an arrest is custodial is that set
out in Carrier."). Accordingly, Levin asserts that this Court should adopt the same
standard of review for motions to suppress pursuant to Fifth Amendment protections as is
now under Brake utilized in appellate review of suppression motions in a Fourth
Amendment context.
Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court recently addressed this identical question
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concerning the applicable standard of review concerning a trial court's determination of a
defendant's custodial status for Miranda purposes. Rosky v. State, — P.3d —, 2005 WL
1242863 (Nev.). The Nevada court noted that its prior cases "have not consistently stated
this court's standard of review" in regards to Miranda protections. 2005 WL 1242863 at
1. The court also indicated that previously a "highly deferential" standard had been
applied. Id. However, the court in Rosky, based upon decisions from the United States
Supreme Court, determined that "a trial court's custody and voluntariness determinations
present mixed questions of law and fact subject to this court's de novo review." Id. See,
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-13, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995); and
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-18, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985).
Accordingly the Rosky court employed a two-step analysis in its review of
Miranda issues:
The district court's purely historical factual findings pertaining to the "scene- and
action-setting" circumstances surrounding an interrogation is entitled to deference
and will be reviewed for clear error. However, the district court's ultimate
determination of whether a person was in custody and whether a statement was
voluntary will be reviewed de novo. Under Thompson and Miller, these decisions
retain a "'uniquely legal dimension,'" requiring the "application of the controlling
legal standard to the historical facts."
Rosky, 2005 WL 1242863 at 1. Nevada courts also utilize the same factors adopted by
this Court in Carrier for determining whether an interrogation prior to an arrest is
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custodial. Id. at 2 (citation omitted). Those factors are: the site of the interrogation,
whether the investigation is focused on the accused, the presence of objective indicia of
arrest, and the length and form of the questioning. Id.
The standard of review adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court in Rosky is the
same standard that has been consistently applied to suppression motions by this Court: a
trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error while its ultimate legal
determinations are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Brake,
2004 UT 95,115 , 103 P.3d 699; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, <H 48, 51, 63 P.3d 650;
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998); State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah
1995); State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 82 (Utah 1993) State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,
1271 (Utah 1993). Levin asserts that this is the correct standard of review for appellate
review of a trial court's Fifth Amendment custodial determinations. Accordingly, Levin
asks that this Court overrule the decision of the court of appeals, and "take the occasion"
to "abandon the standard which extended 'some deference' to the application of law to
the underlying factual findings in Fifth Amendment issues involving Miranda protections
"in favor of non-deferential review." See, Brake, 2004 UT 95 at f 15.

B.

The application of the wrong standard of review led the court of
appeals to erroneously affirm the trial court's denial of Levin's motion
to suppress.

In deciding that Levin was not in custody, the court of appeals correctly cited the
four factors listed in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983).
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However, the court of appeals utilized the wrong standard of review. In addition, because
of the deference afforded the trial court, the court of appeals failed to adequately consider
the four Carrier factors in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances. This led the
court of appeals to erroneously affirm the trial court's denial of Levin's motion to
suppress.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that defendants
shall not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." To secure
this fundamental right, the United States Supreme Court established procedural
safeguards that must be followed during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Statements elicited by police during a
custodial interrogation must be suppressed if a defendant has not been advised of his
constitutional rights per Miranda. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,472 (Utah 1990).
The standard for determining when a defendant is 'in custody' for Miranda
purposes is well settled. "[T]he safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as
soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal
arrest.9" State v. MirqueU 914 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996) (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). "More
specifically, Miranda warnings are required whenever the circumstances of an
interrogation are such that they 'exert upon [the] detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require
that he be warned of his constitutional rights.'" Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1146 (quoting
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Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3149). Additionally, "the proper inquiry as to
whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is whether a reasonable
person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom of action is curtailed to a
degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 355 (Utah App.
1993) (citations omitted).
Utah Courts have repeatedly looked at four key factors in the determination of
whether a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes: 1. The site of the interrogation.
2. Whether the investigation focused on the accused. 3. Whether the objective indicia of
arrest were present. 4. The length and form of the interrogation. Salt Lake City v.
Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983). Whether a defendant is "in custody" for
Miranda purposes "depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the
interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the interrogation rather than on the
subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting the examination." Mirquet, 914
P.2d at 1147. Levin asserts that had the court of appeals used the correct standard of
review his convictions would have been reversed.
The court of appeals concluded that because Levin was interrogated on "a public
road" as part of a traffic stop, the site and of the interrogation suggests that he was not in
custody. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f 14.
In support of its conclusion, the appeals court cited to Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed. 2d 317 (1984), for the proposition that "Traffic stops
on a public road, even if in a relatively remote location, generally do not create the type of
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situation in which 'the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.'" [Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 438]. Also, the open setting of the road, unlike the confines of a police
station or cruiser, reasonably 'diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate,
he will be subjected to abuse.' Id" Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at 114.
However, the court of appeals' reliance on Berkemer is misplaced in this case. The
language quoted by the court of appeals from Berkemer concerns "ordinary traffic
stop[s].ff Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437. Levin asserts that his detention does not fall under
the auspice of such a traffic stop.
The public road on which Levin was detained is more secluded that the typical
traffic stop. However, the court of appeals failed to mention that the public: road at issue
is a dike road south of the Provo Boat Harbor and airport near Utah Lake (R. 292: 17-19,
117 at \\). Moreover, Levin asserts that his detention was not akin to a typical traffic
stop because of the level of police domination that was present. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at
439. Levin was detained for more than a few minutes (R. 294: 61, 181). By the officer's
own admission, Levin was not free to leave (R. 292: 21, 30). Two additional officers
were called in as backup unlike Berkemer where only one officer briefly detained the
defendant and asked him only a few questions. Additionally, Levin was questioned by
multiple officers, given field sobriety tests by multiple officers, and was repeatedly
questioned about drug use by multiple officers R. 292: 20, 26; 294: 33, 37,56-59, 61, 7273, 181, 183, 235). Moreover, Officer Keith felt it was necessary to read the Miranda
warnings to the co-defendant, Johnson (R. 294: 41). The United States Supreme Court in
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Berkemer recognized that "If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop
thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him 'in custody1 for practical purposes, he
will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." 468 U.S. at 440
(citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)).
Levin asserts that he was subjected to treatment by the officers during the traffic stop that
rendered him in custody and entitled to Miranda protections.
In addition, Levin was detained not for only "a few minutes" but for at least an
hour (R. 294: 61, 181). Even the court of appeals recognized that "a stop for over an hour
is more extensive than a routine traffic stop and, thereby, raises some concern that it may
be intrusive enough to constitute custody." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f 15. However,
the court of appeals disposed of its concerns for the length of the interrogation by saying
that this fact alone is not "conclusive of custody." Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at ^[16.
While the length of Levin's detention is not conclusive the custody determination, it
certainly weighs in favor of a finding of custodial status to be weighed in the totality of
the circumstances.
In reaching its decision that Levin was not in custody, the court of appeals also
relied on State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831 (Utah App 1995). Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at
f 19. Strausberg involved an officer asking investigatory questions to a suspect after a
car accident. The officer simply asked the defendant whether he had been involved in an
accident in a certain area of town. Id. at 832. The defendant initially denied that he had
been in that vicinity, then the officer told the defendant that witnesses at the scene
31

described a truck similar to his. Id. Without a Miranda warning, defendant admitted he
had been at that location. Id.
Levin asserts that this case is factually distinguishable from Strausberg. The Court
of Appeals in Strausberg decided that the defendant was not subjected to custodial
interrogation and that the investigatory questions were not accusatory. 895 P.2d at 835.
Here, however, Deputy Keith's questions changed from investigatory in nature to a flat
accusation that "there was no doubt in my mind that you've been smoking marijuana" (R.
294: 37, 59). Moreover, Levin had been repeated questioned about drug use and had
repeatedly denied such use R. 292: 26; 294: 33, 36-37, 59, 183).
While the trial court decided that because this was a statement and not a question,
Levin was not subjected to interrogation; the Court of Appeals correctly held that under
the circumstances, Levin was definitely interrogated and Deputy Keith "should know ...
[that it] was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Levin, 2004 UT App
396 at H ' s 9, 11 (citation omitted). However, despite its correct finding that Levin was
subjected to accusatory interrogation, the Court of Appeals did an about-face and held
that the accusatory statement Deputy Keith made to Levin "was not overly accusatory ...
as to coerce Levin into making an incriminating statement," even though the Court of
Appeals had just stated that a reasonable officer would know such a statement would
likely elicit an incriminating response. 2004 UT App 396 at f 22.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals side-stepped it responsibility of reviewing the trial
court's legal conclusions for correctness, and gave the (rial court "considerable
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deference" on the question of the form of the interrogation. Id. at f 21. The Court of
Appeals should have reviewed the trial court's factual findings with deference and then
reviewed its legal conclusions for correctness. Instead, it merely repeated that the trial
court found that "although the statement made by Deputy Keith was accusatory, it was not
overly accusatory," and then held that it would defer to the trial court's conclusions. Id. at
122. Levin asserts that the Court of Appeals' decision is in conflict with itself since at
one point it found that Levin in fact was subjected to interrogation and that such
interrogation was likely to elicit an incriminating response. Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at f
11.
Furthermore, whether the questioning was "overly accusatory" is not the relevant
inquiry. In Carrier, this Court held that "An accused must be apprised of his Miranda
rights if the setting is custodial or accusatory rather than investigatory. In other words, at
the point the environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police officer's questions
must be prefaced with a Miranda warning." Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170. The United States
Supreme Court has stated further:
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say,
the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but
also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response. The latter portion of this definition focuses
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primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police."
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297
(1980). See also Layton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 1991). Levin
asserts that he was subjected to express questioning and accusations concerning drug use
that was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Finally, Levin asserts that the case the court of appeals should have relied on is this
Court's decision in State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). In Mirquet, this Court
affirmed the court of appeals' ruling that the defendant was in custody for Miranda
purposes. 914 P.2d at 1148. Mirquet was pulled over for a speeding violation. 914 P.2d
at 1145. He subsequently, at the invitation of the officer, entered the police vehicle to
view the speed reading on the radar unit. Id. Both the officer and defendant entered the
vehicle. At this point, the officer detected an odor of marijuana. 914 P.2d at 1146. The
officer then confronted the defendant and stated: "It's obvious to me you've been
smoking marijuana. You know, there's no question in my mind. Would you like to go to
the car to get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get it?" Id. In response, the
defendant retrieved the marijuana. 914 P.2d at 1146. The officer subsequently searched
the vehicle and found cocaine, marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. Accordingly, this
Court held that the facts in light of the factors set forth in Carner support the ultimate
conclusion that Mirquet was 'in custody.'" Id.
Levin asserts that, like Mirquet, he was confronted by an officer "who made a
direct accusation of illegal conduct" and that this case "does not involve an unarticulated
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suspicion" focused on him but rather an accusation by an officer in which he "explicitly
stated his conclusion of illegal conduct" and in effect, directed Levin to incriminate
himself in order to end the detention. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147, 1148. Accordingly,
Levin was entitled to receive the benefit of Miranda warnings prior to being so
interrogated because investigative questioning turns to accusatory questioning when the
police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
defendant committed it. Carrier, 664 P.2d at 1171.
Levin asks this Court to correct the wrong conclusion reached by the court of
appeals because of the deference it erroneously afforded the trial court by holding that he
was in custody and entitled to the protections afforded pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.

C.

The denial of Levin's motion to suppress was not harmless
Levin asserts that the trial court's error of denying his motion to suppress

statements obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
"It is well established that the admission of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda can be harmless error. For federal constitutional error to be held harmless, we
must sincerely believe that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" State v.
Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted).
Moreover, "It is not enough that we would find sufficient evidence to support the
conviction even if the statement is excised from the record. It is inconsequential that a
35

retrial will most likely result in a conviction." Id. at 867. The evidence must be "so
compelling that we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have
reached the same verdict without learning of [the defendant's] incriminating statement."
Id.
The evidence linking Levin to these charges without his incriminating statements
is too attenuated to support a conviction, let alone to reach a conclusion beyond a
reasonable doubt. Officer's Orton and Beeder testified that they thought it was possible
that Levin had smoked marijuana due to the results of his field sobriety tests (R. 294: 7879, 119). However, both officers admitted that the tests were inconclusive and were only
partially complete and required blood and urine testing to make any accurate findings (R.
294: 94, 97-98, 119,124). Moreover, Keith testified that he neither smelled marijuana
nor found marijuana on Levin (R. 294: 56, 70). Furthermore, Keith thought there was
insufficient evidence to arrest Levin for DUI even though Levin admitted to drinking two
wine coolers and taking Lortab on an empty stomach (R. 292: 24; 294: 174, 185).
And although Johnson told Keith that Levin had smoked with him, he also told
Keith that he alone smoked and possessed the marijuana and that Levin did not possess
the marijuana (R. 294: 42, 237-38).
Without the incriminating statements, Levin asserts that he would not have been
convicted and accordingly requests this Court to reverse his convictions,
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CONCLUSION
Levin asks that this Court reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and
remand this matter back to the Fourth District with instructions that the matter is to be
dismissed.
SUBMITTED this 6th day of June, 2005.

MARGARET P. LINDSAY
Attorney for Appellee/Petitioner
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State of Utah,
Respondent,
v.

Case No. 20050001-SC

Ralph Levin,
Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on Jan 3, 2005.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue:
Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of
review in reviewing the district court's determination that the
defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda protections A briefing schedule will issue hereafter. Pursuant to rule
2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that permits
the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their
briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be permitted to
stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent extraordinary
circumstances, no extensions will be granted by motion. The
parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon its
issuance.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ralph LEVIN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20030336-CA.
Nov. 4, 2004.
Background: Defendant was convicted, after a
jury trial in the Fourth District Court, Provo
Department, James R. Taylor, J., of possession or
use of marijuana with prior conviction, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant
appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held
that:
(1) officer's statement to defendant, that officer
"knew [defendant] had smoked marijuana," was the
functional equivalent of express questioning and
therefore was "interrogation," as element for
requiring Miranda warnings; but
(2) defendant had not been in "custody," for
Miranda purposes; and
(3) defendant opened the door to admission, as
impeachment evidence, of his prior felony drug
conviction.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €^H34(3)
110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases
11] Criminal Law €=>1158(4)
110k 1158(4) Most Cited Cases
In reviewing the trial court's denial of a defendant's
motion to suppress, the appellate court examines the
underlying factual findings for clear error, and
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based
thereon for correctness.

[2] Criminal Law €=>l 158(2)
110kl 158(2) Most Cited Cases
Because the determination of custody, for Miranda
purposes, is fact-sensitive and the facts to which the
legal rule is to be applied are so complex and
varying that no rule adequately addressing the
relevance of all the facts can be spelled out,
appellate court recognizes that trial court has a
degree of discretion unless such determination
exceeds established legal boundaries.
[3] Criminal Law €=>l 153(1)
110kl 153(1) Most Cited Cases
Trial court's conclusion to admit defendant's prior
felony conviction, as impeachment evidence, would
be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rules of Evid.,
Rule 609.
[4] Criminal Law €=^412.2(2)
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases
[4] Criminal Law €=>412.2(3)
110k412.2(3) Most Cited Cases
Police officers must provide Miranda warnings
prior to subjecting a suspect to a "custodial
interrogation," which is defined as questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.
[5] Criminal Law €==>412.1(4)
110k412.1(4) Most Cited Cases
Officer's statement to motorist, that officer "knew
[motorist] had smoked marijuana," was the
functional equivalent of express questioning and
therefore was "interrogation," as element for
requiring Miranda warnings; statement was made in
course of express questioning to which motorist had
already responded, and officer should have known
the statement was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.
[6] Criminal Law €^412.2(2)
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(Cite as: 101 P.3d 846, 2004 UT App 396)
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases
Motorist was not in "custody," for Miranda
purposes,
when
officer
elicited
motorist's
incriminating statement that he had smoked
marijuana; objective indicia of arrest were missing,
interrogation occurred on public road, officer's
statement that he "knew" motorist had used drugs
was not so accusatory that it would cause
reasonable person to feel his freedom of action had
been significantly limited, and although encounter
lasted over an hour,
such time frame was not unreasonable, as car had
two occupants in addition to motorist and law
enforcement support personnel had to travel to
scene. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
[7] Criminal Law €^>412.2(2)
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases
Miranda does not require law enforcement officers
to warn suspects before interrogation in all cases;
rather, Miranda requirements apply only when the
suspect is subject to formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with
a formal arrest.
[8] Criminal Law €=>412.2(2)
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases
Whether events surrounding an interrogation
amount to custody, so that Miranda warnings are
required, depends on the objective circumstances
and not on the subjective views harbored by either
the interrogating officer or the person being
questioned.
[9] Criminal Law €^>412.2(2)
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, the court determines whether the
defendant was in custody, for Miranda purposes,
with reference to four factors: (1) the site of
interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused
on the defendant; (3) whether objective indicia of
arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of
interrogation.
[10] Criminal Law €=>412.2(2)
110k412.2(2) Most Cited Cases
In deciding the custody issue, as element for
requiring Miranda warnings, the totality of the
© 2005 Thomson/West. No C

circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is
dispositive.
[11] Criminal Law€^>519(9)
110k519(9) Most Cited Cases
The question of whether a police statement is so
accusatory as to coerce a suspect into an unwanted
confession is a question of degree which the trial
court is best suited to decide.
[12] Witnesses €^=>406
410k406 Most Cited Cases
Defendant's
testimony,
in
drug
possession
prosecution, that "I don't smoke marijuana" and "I
haven't smoked marijuana," opened the door to
admission, as impeachment evidence, of defendant's
prior felony drug conviction. Rules of Evid., Rule
609.
[13] Witnesses €==>406
410k406 Most Cited Cases
When a defendant testifies that he has never used
drugs, a trial court does not abuse its discretion
when it allows the prosecution to present evidence
of the defendant's prior conviction for drug
possession, as impeachment evidence. Rules of
Evid., Rule 609.
[14] Witnesses €^>406
410k406 Most Cited Cases
When a defendant seeks to mischaracterize a prior
conviction, the court does not abuse its discretion in
allowing the State to use prior conviction evidence
as impeachment evidence to directly contradict the
defendant's previous inaccurate testimony. Rules of
Evid., Rule 609.
*847 Margaret P. Lindsay, Orem, for Appellant.
Carlyle Kay Bryson and Nyal C. Bodily, Provo, for
Appellee.
Before BILLINGS, P.J., JACKSON and THORNE
,JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
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101 P.3d 846, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2004 UT App 396
(Cite as: 101 P.3d 846, 2004 UT App 396)
**1 Ralph Levin challenges his conviction for
possession or use of marijuana with a prior
conviction under Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
and for possession of drug paraphernalia under
Utah Code section 58-37a-5(l). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
**2 In May 2001, Deputy Wayne Keith was
patrolling along the Provo Dike Road when he
noticed that the registration tags of a convertible car
parked on the side of the road were expired. He
pulled up behind the car and walked to the car on
foot to notify its three occupants. The car's
convertible roof was down, and, while standing
beside the car, Deputy Keith noticed several open
containers in plain view and asked the occupants for
identification. Upon a subsequent search of the
vehicle, he found a "socket" tool that had been used
to smoke marijuana and several small bags
containing marijuana in a backpack. Deputy Keith
radioed for drug recognition officers to assist at the
scene. When the officers arrived they conducted
several field sobriety tests that indicated that the
driver, Levin, had been smoking marijuana. When
Deputy Keith asked Levin if he had been smoking
marijuana, Levin responded *848 that he had not.
At some point, Deputy Keith stated that he knew
Levin had been smoking marijuana, to which Levin
responded he had.
**3 Levin was cited for possession or use of
marijuana with a prior conviction, in violation of
Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), and for
possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of
Utah Code section 58- 37a-5(l) (1998). He pleaded
not guilty to both counts.
**4 Before trial, Levin moved to suppress
statements he made at the time of his citation,
claiming that Deputy Keith had subjected him to
custodial interrogation without informing him of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The court
denied the motion on May 22, 2002.
**5 Prior to trial, Levin also moved to exclude
evidence of a prior conviction for possession or use
of marijuana and moved to bifurcate the matter of

his prior conviction. The trial court granted both
motions on May 14, 2002. However, during his
direct examination at trial, Levin stated that "1 don't
smoke marijuana, and I haven't smoked marijuana."
Before cross-examination, the State asked the court
to rule on the admissibility of Levin's prior drug
conviction in light of the statements he had made
during direct examination. The court concluded
that Levin's statements had "opened the door" and
permitted the State to admit evidence of Levin's
prior drug conviction under rule 609 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. At the conclusion of evidence,
the judge read an instruction explaining that the jury
could only consider the prior conviction evidence
for assessing credibility.
**6 The jury convicted Levin on both counts. On
appeal, Levin challenges the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress and the court's ruling to
permit evidence of prior crimes.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] **7 " 'In reviewing the trial court's denial of
[a defendant's] motion to suppress, we examine the
underlying factual findings for clear error, and
review the trial court's conclusions of law based
thereon for correctness.' " State v. Alfred, 2002 UT
App 291,H 8, 55 P.3d 1158 (quoting State v. Hayes,
860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). However,
because the determination
of custody
is
fact-sensitive and " 'the facts to which the legal rule
is to be applied are so complex and varying that no
rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these
facts can be spelled out,' " we recognize that the
trial court has a degree of discretion "unless such
determination
exceeds
established
legal
boundaries." State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929
(Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)) (other citations
omitted).
[3] **8 With regard to the court's determination to
admit evidence of Levin's prior conviction, we
review the trial court's conclusion for abuse of
discretion. See Jensen v. Intermountain Power
Agency, 1999 UT I0,1f 12, 977 P.2d 474 ("[I]n
reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or
exclude evidence, we allow for broad discretion.").
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ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Suppress
A. Trial Court's Findings of Fact
**9 The trial court entered the following findings
of fact in its May 22, 2002 order denying Levin's
motion to suppress:
1. On May 2, 2001, Deputy Wayne Keith was
patrolling Provo Dike Road that is located just
south of the Provo Boat Harbor. This is a public
road.
2. Deputy Keith observed a convertible vehicle
that was parked on the side of the road. Deputy
Keith noticed that the registration was expired on
the vehicle and subsequently stopped his vehicle
behind the parked convertible. Deputy Keith did
not activate his overhead lights or his siren when
he parked behind the vehicle. Furthermore, he
did not block their vehicle from moving or
leaving with the position of his vehicle.
3. Deputy Keith observed three occupants sitting
in the car.
4. Deputy Keith approached the vehicle on foot
and observed several open containers of alcohol
in plain view in both the *849 front and rear area
of the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
5. Deputy Keith asked for the three passenger's
[sic] identification. Defendant was determined to
be the individual sitting in the driver's seat.
6. Deputy Keith asked the occupants to step out
of the vehicle and [explained] that he was going
to search for more open containers.
7. Deputy Keith began searching the vehicle for
open containers. In the center console, which
was large enough to house an open container,
Deputy Keith smelled the odor of marijuana and
observed a metal "socket" that was fashioned into
a pipe. The socket smelled of marijuana and
appeared to have marijuana residue in the "pipe."
8. In a back-pack in the back seat, Deputy Keith
found three plastic bags that were determined to
contain marijuana. The rear[-] seated passenger
stated it was his back-pack.
9. Deputy Keith asked Defendant about the
socket that was found in the center console
between the driver's and passenger seat[s].
Defendant stated he did not know it was there and
insisted that he had not smoked any marijuana.
At this time, Defendant was not under arrest nor

was he handcuffed.
10. Within a short time, two other officers
arrived. Because Defendant was in the driver's
seat, Defendant was asked to perform some field
sobriety tests.
11. The officer that conducted the field sobriety
tests on Defendant, Deputy Todd Orton, was a
certified Drug Recognition Expert. After the
conclusion of the field sobriety tests, Deputy
Orton believed Defendant was possibly under the
influence of marijuana; however, it was felt that
he was not impaired to the poini that he could not
safely operate a motor vehicle.
12. Deputy Orton informed Deputy Keith of his
belief that the Defendant was possibly under the
influence of marijuana but that he was not
impaired to the point that he could not safely
operate a motor vehicle.
13. Deputy Keith then told Defendant that he
"knew he had smoked marijuana." This was not
phrased in the form of a question. Furthermore,
no evidence was elicited on cross-examination
that Deputy Keith made this comment while
confronting the Defendant or while "in his face."
No evidence was attained that was anything more
than a statement casually made to Defendant.
14. Up to this point, Defendant had maintained a
lack of knowledge of the marijuana or the pipe.
However, Defendant then told Deputy Keith that
he had only taken a couple of hits of marijuana
while at that location. He stated that both he and
the back seated passenger had smoked out of a
pipe.
15. Deputy Keith was surprised when Defendant
stated he had smoked marijuana while at that
location. Deputy Keith testified that he did not
expect Defendant to say anything in response.
Deputy Keith did not even ask a question and was
surprised when Defendant responded with an
incriminating statement.
16. Defendant, along with the other occupants of
the vehicle, was never arrested, never handcuffed
and was merely given a citation. Defendant was
then allowed to drive the vehicle away from the
location with his friends as passengers.
Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that
Levin was neither in custody nor subject to
interrogation such that Deputy Keith was required
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to provide him with a Miranda warning. In his
appeal, Levin does not dispute these factual
findings; rather, he claims that the court "erred in
its conclusion that [he] was not in custody or
subject to interrogation for Miranda purposes."
B. Miranda Warnings
[4] **10 Police officers must provide Miranda
warnings prior to subjecting a suspect to a
"custodial interrogation," which is defined as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
*850 1. Interrogation
[5] **11 As an initial matter, we disagree with the
trial court's determination that Keith's questions did
not result in an "interrogation" for purposes of
Miranda. The Supreme Court has defined
"interrogation" to comprise "not only ... express
questioning, but also ... any words or actions on the
part of police (other than those normally attendant
to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Thus,
statements by police "to which no response from the
respondent [are] invited" do not constitute an
"interrogation." Id. at 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682.
However, a "lengthy harangue in the presence of the
suspect" may amount to an interrogation. Id. at
303, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Although Keith's statement to
Levin may not have been punctuated with a
question mark, it was made in the course of express
questioning to which Levin had already responded.
Given this context, Keith's assertion was a type
Keith "should know [was] reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response" from Levin. Id. at 302,
100 S.Ct. 1682. Thus, we must conclude that the
statement was the "functional equivalent" to express
questioning and, therefore, an "interrogation." Id.
at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682.
2. Custody
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[6][7][8] **12 Nonetheless, we agree with the irial
court's determination that Levin was not in
"custody" at the time the interview took place.
Miranda does not require law enforcement officers
to warn suspects before interrogation in all cases.
Rather, Miranda requirements only apply when the
suspect is subject to " 'formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with
a formal arrest.' " Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S.
318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526,128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)
(per curiam) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463
U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275
(1983)) (other quotations and citation omitted).
Whether events surrounding an interrogation
amount to custody depends on the "objective
circumstances" and "not on the subjective views
harbored by either the interrogating officer[ ] or the
person being questioned." Id. at 323, 114 S.Ct.
1526.
[9][10] **13 Under Utah law, we determine
whether a suspect was in custody with reference to
four factors: " '(1) the site of interrogation; (2)
whether the investigation focused on the accused;
(3) whether objective indicia of arrest were present;
and (4) the length and form of interrogation.' "
State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996)
(quoting Salt Lake City v. Corner, 664 P.2d 1168,
1171 (Utah 1983)). "We emphasize that " 'in
deciding the custody issue, the totality of the
circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is
dispositive.' " State v. Worthington, 970 P.2d 714,
716 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quoting Stansbury, 511
U.S. at 321, 114 S.Ct. 1526) (alteration omitted).
**14 We begin by listing those factors that suggest
Levin was not in custody. First, the objective
indicia of arrest are missing: there were no "readied
handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns." Carner,
664 P.2d at 1171. Second, the site of the
interrogation was a public road. Traffic stops on a
public road, even if in a relatively remote location,
generally do not create the type of situation in
which "the motorist feels completely at the mercy of
the police." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
438, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). Also,
the open setting of the road, unlike the confines of a
police station or cruiser, reasonably "diminishes the
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will
be subjected to abuse " Id
**15 We now turn to those factors that could
sustain a determination that Levin was in custody
Levin's argument focuses primarily on the duration
of the encounter, which he describes at one point as
lasting an hour and at another point as lasting an
hour and a half Generally, traffic stops are
afforded a presumption of validity because they are
"temporary and brief in nature and the suspect
knows that "m the end he will most likely be
allowed to continue on his way" Id at 437, 104
S Ct 3138 Here, however, a stop for over an hour
is more extensive than a routine traffic stop and,
thereby, raises some concern that it may be intrusive
enough to constitute custody
*851 **16 In determining at what point a stop
begins to assume the character of an arrest, we note
that the Supreme Court has rejected bright-line time
limits to police stops " '[W]e question the wisdom
of a rigid time limitation Such a limit would
undermine the equally important need to allow
authonties to graduate their responses to the
demands of any particular situation' " United
States v Sharpe, 470 U S 675, 686, 105 S Ct
1568, 84 LEd2d 605 (1985) (quoting United
States v Place, 462 U S 696, 709 n 10, 103 S Ct
2637, 77 LEd2d 110 (1983)) We too are
reluctant to conclude that the mere fact that a stop
lasted over an hour is conclusive of custody
**17 Rather, we consider the reasonableness of
the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances
We have recognized that investigative stops
involving several suspects must be afforded
additional time See State v Allred, 2002 UT App
291,f 13, 55 P 3d 1158 (questioning six suspects
for up to forty minutes does not constitute custody)
Similarly, it is reasonable for a stop to require over
an hour when an officer calls support personnel who
must travel to the scene See State v Gar butt, 173
Vt 277, 790 A 2d 444, 449- 50 (2001) (holding
that detaining suspect for seventy-five minutes
while awaiting support personnel did not constitute
custody), People v Forster, 29 CalApp4th 1746,
35 CalRptr2d 705, 709-10 (1994) (holdmg that
© 2005 Thomson/West No C

detaining suspect for "a little more than an hour"
while awaiting support personnel did not constitute
custody) Here, although Levin was detained for
over an hour, that amount of time was not
unreasonable given the circumstances The officers
were dealing with thiee suspects at the scene and
had to perform a number of tasks, which included
(1) collecting identification from each suspect, (2)
investigating and collecting evidence regarding a
possible open container violation (3) investigating
and collecting evidence regarding possible drug
possession and use, (4) summormg and awaiting
support officers trained in drug recognition, (5)
performing field sobriety tests or each suspect for
alcohol and drug consumption, and (6) preparing
citations Taken together, a stop lasting over an
hour under these circumstances is not unreasonable
**18 Levin next argues that he was m "custody"
because he was the focus ol Deputy Keith's
investigation and because Deputy Keith directly
accused him of using drugs We recognize that "a
police officer's subjective view that the individual
under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does
not bear upon the question of custody for purposes
of Miranda" Stansbury v California, 511 U S
318, 324, 114 SCt 1526, 128 L E d 2 d 293 (1994)
(per curiam) However, when a police officei
expresses his suspicions to a suspect, "[t]hose
beliefs are relevant only to the extent that they
would affect how a reasonable person m the
position of the individual being questioned would
gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action "
Id at 325, 114 SCt 1526 (quotations and citation
omitted) Thus, "[e]\en a clear statement from an
officer that the person under mterrogation is a prime
suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody
issue
The weight and pertinence of any
communications regarding the officer's degree of
suspicion will depend upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case " Id
**19 Here, then, we must determine whether
Deputy Keith's assertion that he knew Levin had
used drugs would cause a reasonable person m
Levm's position to feel his "freedom of action" had
been significantly limited See id On this issue,
the facts of this case are largely analogous to those
to Ong U S Govt Works
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of State v Strausberg 895 P 2d 831 (Utah
Ct App 1995) There, the defendant fled from the
scene of an accident he had caused, and police used
descriptions provided by witnesses to later identify
and stop him See id at 832 After observing
evidence of the collision on the vehicle, a police
officer asked the defendant if he had been m an
accident that night See id The defendant denied
any involvement See id Without giving a Miranda
warning, the officer explained that witnesses had
identified a similar vehicle at the scene of the
accident, and, confronted with this information, the
driver made incriminating statements See id
**20 In determining whether the defendant was in
custody, the Strausberg court held that " '[b]ecause
the determination of custody for Miranda purposes
is fact sensitive, we *852 accord a measure of
discretion to the trial court's determination unless
such determination exceeds established legal
boundaries' " Id at 834 n 5 (quotmg State v
Teuscher 883 P 2d 922, 929 (Utah Ct App 1994))
The court then concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion m concluding the defendant was
not in custody because the "question was not
coercive and was merely investigatory in nature "
Id at 835
[11] **21 We agree that the question of whether a
police statement is so accusatory as to coerce a
suspect into an unwanted confession is a question of
degree for which the trial court is best suited to
decide [FN1] Therefore, in determining whether
Deputy Keith's statement was so accusatory that it
would "affect how a reasonable person
would
gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action,"
Stansbury 511 U S at 325, 114 S Ct 1526
(quotations and citations omitted), we afford the
trial court considerable discretion
FN1 The trial court is m a superior
position
to
weight
fact-intensive
considerations because "it is before that
court that the witnesses and parties appear
and the evidence is adduced" State v
Pena 869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)
Thus, "[t]he judge of that court is therefore
considered to be in the best position to
© 2005 Thomson/West No C
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assess the credibility of witnesses and to
derive a sense of the proceeding as a
whole, somethmg an appellate court cannot
hope to garner from a cold record " Id
**22 In this case, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that "although the
statement made by Deputy Keith was accusatory, it
was not overly accusatory " Such a conclusion does
not "exceed [ ] established legal boundaries,"
particularly because the Stiausberg court reached a
sunilar conclusion with similar facts 895 P 2d at
834-35 As such, we rely on the trial court's
determination that Deputy Keith's statement was not
so accusatory as to coerce Levin into making an
incriminating statement
**23 Based on these considerations, we conclude
that the totality of the circumstances in this case
weigh against a determination that Levm was in
"custody" for Miranda purposes Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court's denial of Levin's motion to
suppress
II Admissibility of Prior Conviction Evidence
[12] **24 Prior to trial, Levin also moved to
exclude evidence of a prior conviction for
possession or use of marijuana and moved to
bifurcate the matter of the prior conviction The
trial court granted both motions on May 14, 2002
However, during the May 22, 2002 trial, the
following exchange took place during Levin's direct
examination
Q Okay Did [Deputy Keith] ask you any other
questions at that point?
A I don't remember
Q Did he ask you if you had been smoking
marijuana
A He did
Q atthat point?
A Yes, he did He asked me if I had been
smoking, if it was mine, and I told him it's not
mine, and I don't smoke marijuana, and I haven't
smoked marijuana
Before the State began its cross examination, it
asked the court to allow it to question Levin
regarding his prior drug conviction After a brief
hearing, the trial court determined that Levm had
to Ong U S Govt Works
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101 P.3d 846, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2004 UT App396
(Cite as: 101 P.3d 846, 2004 UT App 396)
"opened the door" to such evidence when he
"misled the jury and left the jury with a potential
false impression" by testifying that "I don't smoke
marijuana, and I haven't smoked marijuana." On
cross-examination, Levin admitted his prior drug
conviction, and, at the conclusion of evidence, the
court instructed the jury to consider the prior
conviction evidence only for the purpose of
weighing credibility.
**25 Evidence of a prior conviction for a crime
punishable in excess of one year is admissible under
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence "if the
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs it prejudicial
effect to the accused." Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1).
Rule 403 also applies to exclude evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. As
mentioned above, we review the trial court's ruling
on these evidentiary matters only for abuse of
discretion. See *853 Jensen v. Intermountain
Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,1 ^ , 977 P.2d 474.
[13][14] **26 When a defendant testifies that he
has never used drugs, a trial court does not abuse its
discretion when it allows the prosecution to present
evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for
drug possession. See Gee v. Pride, 992 F.2d 159,
161-62 (8th Cir.1993) (admitting evidence of prior
conviction for drug possession after defendant
testified he had never used PCP) (construing
Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)). Similarly, when a defendant
seeks to mischaracterize a prior conviction, the
court does not abuse its discretion in allowing the
State to use prior conviction evidence "to directly
contradict the defendant's previous inaccurate
testimony." State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 824
(Utah Ct.App.1990) (admitting evidence of cocaine
use relating to prior attempted forgery conviction);
see also United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 616,
619 (8th Cir.1995) (admitting details of past drug
conviction when defendant "attempted to minimize
his guilt regarding the prior conviction")
(construing Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)).

its discretion in determining that Levin's statements
that "I don't smoke marijuana' and "I haven't
smoked marijuana" could mislead jurors. Nor did it
abuse its discretion when it concluded that the prior
conviction evidence would have substanlial
probative value in clarifying the record and
remedying any mischaracterizations. Finally, the
court limited any improper prejudicial effect by
instructing the jury to consider the evidence only for
purposes of credibility.
CONCLUSION
**28 We conclude that the trial court did not en in
denying Levin's motion to suppress and did not
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Levin's
prior drug conviction at trial. Accordingly, we
affirm.
**29 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR.,
Judge.
101 P.3d 846, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2004 UT
App 396
END OF DOCUMENT

**27 In the present case, the court did not abuse
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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This matter came before this Court on January 16, 2002, for a hearing on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress. Defendant Ralph Levin was present and represented by Jennifer Gowans.
The State was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, John J. Easton. The Court, having
heard testimony from the lead officer, Deputy Wayne Keith, allowed Defendant additional time to
conduct additional research and file a supplemental brief supporting her initial Motion to
Suppress. Oral argument was heard on February 13, 2002. Defendant had filed a supplemental
brief and was again represented by Jennifer Gowans. The State was represented by John J.
Easton. Having heard the relevant testimony and oral arguments on this matter, the Court does
hereby make and enter the following Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order.

I:B

FINDINGS OF FACTS
The following facts were established at the Suppression Hearing held in this matter that
was conducted on January 16, 2002'
1.

On May 2, 2001, Deputy Wayne Keith was patrolling Provo Dike Road that is
located just south of the Provo Boat Harbor. This is a public road.

2.

Deputy Keith observed a convertible vehicle that was parked on the side of the
road. Deputy Keith noticed that the registration was expired on the vehicle and
subsequently stopped his vehicle behind the parked convertible. Deputy Keith did
not activate his overhead lights or his siren when he parked behind the vehicle.
Furthermore, he did not block their vehicle from moving or leaving with the
position of his vehicle.

3.

Deputy Keith observed three occupants sitting in the car.

4.

Deputy Keith approached the vehicle on foot and observed several open containers
of alcohol in plain view in both the front and rear area of the passenger
compartment of the vehicle.

5.

Deputy Keith asked for the three passenger's identification. Defendant was
determined to be the individual sitting in the driver's seat.

6.

Deputy Keith asked the occupants to step out of the vehicle and that he was going
to search for more open containers. AMhaWime^eputy^K^h-^alted-4^i^ba^k-up-/ n^j
%£&eers—

7.

Deputy Keith began searching the vehicle for open containers. In the center
console, which was large enough to house an open container, Deputy Keith
smelled the odor of marijuana and observed a metal "socket" that was fashioned
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into a pipe The socket smelled of marijuana and appeared to have marijuana
residue in the "pipe "
8.

In a back-pack in the back seat, Deputy Keith found three plastic bags that were
determined to contain marijuana The rear seated passenger stated it was his backpack.

9.

Deputy Keith asked Defendant about the socket that was found in the center ^ ^

m4r ''A'

console between the driver's and passenger seat. Defendant stated he-d^khow it
was there and insisted that he had not smoked any marijuana. At this time,
Defendant was not under arrest nor was he handcuffed.
10.

Within a short time, two other officers arrived. Because Defendant was in the
driver's seat, Defendant was asked to perform some field sobriety tests

11.

The officer that conducted the field sobriety tests on Defendant, Deputy Todd
Orton, was a certified Drug Recognition Expert. After the conclusion of the field
sobriety tests, Deputy Orton believed Defendant was mest4ifeely tinder the
influence of marijuana, however, it was felt that he was not impaired to the point
that he could not safely operate a motor vehicle.

12.

Deputy Orton informed Deputy Keith of his belief that the Defendant was-hkel^ ^~
under the influence of marijuana but that he was not impaired to the point that he
could not safely operate a motor vehicle.

13.

Deputy Keith then told Defendant that he "knew he had smoked marijuana " This
was not phrased in the form of a question. Furthermore, no evidence was elicited
on cross-examination that Deputy Keith made this comment while confronting the
Defendant or while "in his face " No evidence was attained that this was anything
more than a statement casually made to Defendant.
3

14.

Up to this point, Defendant had maintained a lack of knowledge of the marijuana
or the pipe. However, Defendant then told Deputy Keith that he had only taken a
couple hits of marijuana while at that location. He stated that both he and the back
seated passenger had smoked out of a pipe.

15.

Deputy Keith was surprised when Defendant stated he had smoked marijuana
while at that location Deputy Keith testified that he did not expect Defendant to
say anything in response. Deputy Keith did not even ask a question and was
surprised when Defendant responded with an incriminating statement.

16.

Defendant, along with the other occupants of the vehicle, was never arrested,
never handcuffed and was merely given a citation. Defendant was then allowed to
drive the vehicle away from that location with his friends as passengers.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A.

DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY

The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom
of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996) However, a "person may be seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes but not be in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. State v.
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). Whether one is "in custody'1 for Miranda purposes
depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the interrogation with respect to the
compulsory nature of the interrogation rather than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the
oflBcers conducting the examination, [citation omitted] Id, at 1147. Particularly, in the context of
a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers, even though they have been stopped and, at
least momentarily, are not free to leave, are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996).

During a routine traffic stop even if an officer engages in some degree of accusatory
questioning of the driver during the course of the stop and even though the officer may have a
subjective, unstated intent to arrest the driver, the person is not "in custody" for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d
1144, 1147 (Utah 1996).
Because Defendant was not placed in handcuffs, restrained in the police vehicle, or
restrained in any physical way other than being stopped for various violations he was never placed
in formal arrest. Because Defendant was never formally arrested, this Court had to determine
whether Defendant was in "custody" requiring the safeguards against self incrimination through a
Miranda warning.
There are occasions when a defendant is entitled to & Miranda warning prior to a formal
arrest; therefore, to determine when an individual is "in custody" the Utah Supreme Court has
outlined four factors. Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). To determine
whether an individual is in custody, courts must look to (1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether
the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present;
and (4) the length and form of interrogation. A/, at 1171.
(1)

Defendant was questioned while on the side of the road by his vehicle. He
was never questioned while at the police station, jail or while inside the
squad car. Defendant was always outside on a public road with his
passenger friends during this entire episode.

(2)

The investigation did not focus solely on the accused. Defendant was one
of three individuals that were stopped and cited that night. Both
passengers of the vehicle were cited for either marijuana or open
containers. Furthermore, the investigation focused on all three individuals.
5

(3)

There were no objective indicia of arrest present. Defendant was never
handcuffed. Defendant was never placed in a squad car. Defendant stood
on the side of the road next to his vehicle with his friends the entire time.
Defendant was conversing with his friends during this time. Vehicle sirens
and lights were not used by Deputy Keith. Defendant even drove away
from the scene. Defendant performed field sobriety tests; however, he was
not under arrest and could have refused to comply with any of those
requests.

(4)

The length and form of interrogation was not inherently long. It was never
elicited on direct or cross-examination exactly how long the detention
lasted. Furthermore, the "interrogation" was not even in the form of a
question and was only an accusatory statement.

Although "the accusatory nature of questioning is a relevant factor in determining whether
a person is in custody, . . . it is not dispositive of the issue. Moreover, whether the interrogating
officer entertains subjective suspicions that the subject has committed a crime is irrelevant." State
v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah 1996). "Although many encounters between citizens and
police, especially in the context of a traffic stop, can give rise to accusatory-type questioning, that
factor alone does not dispositively determine whether a person is in custody." Id, at 1148.
The mere fact that Defendant is asked to perform field sobriety tests and that there are
three officers present does not amount to a determination that the Defendant is in "custody"
requiring a Miranda warning. Furthermore, although the statement made by Deputy Keith was
accusatory, it was not overly accusatory. Defendant had maintained a lack of knowledge of any
drugs, marijuana or paraphernalia. Deputy Keith testified that he did not expect Defendant to
answer him when he told Defendant that "he knew he had been smoking marijuana." Deputy
6

Keith was surprised when Defendant subsequently stated that he had smoked marijuana that night
while parked there.
Since a "traffic stop is substantially less police dominated" than typical interrogation the
"noncoercive aspect of traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant
to such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 440 (1984); State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1222 (Utah 1987)
In analyzing the four factors established by the Utah Supreme Court in Carrier the facts
of this case do not lead to the determination that Defendant was in custody at the time he
admitted to smoking marijuana Defendant was on the side of the road and not in the police car,
the investigation was not focused solely on the Defendant, there were no objective indicia of
arrest as Defendant was never arrested, handcuffed or physically restrained and Deputy Keith's
statement was not a "form of interrogation."
The Court hereby finds that Defendant was not in custody at the time he made
incriminating statements and Defendant's motion is denied.
B.

DEFENDANT WAS NOT SUBJECT TO INTERROGATION WHEN HE
ADMITTED SMOKING MARIJUANA

Defendant was not subject to interrogation or the functional equivalent of interrogation at
the time he admitted smoking marijuana.
InMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the Supreme Court held that "the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Subsequently, in Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court
held that the safeguards of Miranda are required whenever a person in custody is subjected to
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either express questioning or its "functional equivalent.5' Rhode Island v. Inms, 446 U.S 291,
301 (1980). That court went on to define the "functional equivalent" of interrogation as,
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest or custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect. Id, at 301.
Deputy Keith's statement was not phrased in the form of a question. He merely stated
that he knew the Defendant had smoked marijuana. Up until this point, the Defendant had denied
smoking any marijuana; therefore, it is very reasonable to believe that the Defendant would either
not respond or would maintain his denial. This mere statement was not a question that Deputy
Keith "knew or should know was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" from the
Defendant. Deputy Keith even testified that he was surprised when Defendant made an
incriminating response by stating he had smoked marijuana that night.
"[VJolunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their
admissibility is not affected by [Miranda]" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). This
confession was not in response to interrogation. Defendant was not asked a question. Deputy
Keith did not expect Defendant to respond to his statement. Deputy Keith was not coercive in his
statement. He was not threatening Defendant or telling him that he would charge him with the
crimes anyway.
Accordingly, although not dispositive due to the finding that the Defendant was not in
custody at the time he made incriminating statements, this Court holds that not only was
Defendant not in custody but he was also not subject to interrogation.

8
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court hereby Orders
that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED
Signed this £2
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District Court Judge
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